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ABSTRACT: Contemporary far-right politicians increasingly diffuse messages through social networks. This 
article argues that online communication may prove effective for political engagement because it can cre-
ate emotional reactions against certain groups, in a process that I call “emotional antagonism.” An exam-
ple of emotional antagonism is online Islamophobia, which considers Islam as supposedly incompatible 
with democratic values and tends to conflate Muslims with migrants. Through qualitative observations and 
textual analyses of tweets, this article explores the following questions: How do certain online exchanges 
emotionally frame Muslims as the social “others” in relation to European culture? Why and how does the 
Internet facilitate the spread of emotional antagonism? What type of political propaganda and participa-
tion is connected to affective online Islamophobia? The article analyses two case studies: 1) Islamophobic 
tweets sent in the aftermath of the British referendum in 2016, with the hashtag #Brexit; 2) Anti-Muslim 
tweets that contain the hashtag #chiudiamoiporti (close the ports), launched by Italian Vice Prime Minister 
Matteo Salvini in 2018 to support anti-migration measures. The article shows that exploring emotional an-
tagonism can add complexity to the current understanding of Islamophobic conflicts, of social media plat-
forms’ characteristics, and of political participation based on online communication. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Donald Trump, in July 2019, sent a Twitter thread against the four American con-
gresswomen Ayanna Pressley, Ilhan Omar, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Rashida Tlaib. 
The thread reads as follows: 
 
So interesting to see “Progressive” Democrat Congresswomen, who originally came 
from countries whose governments are a complete and total catastrophe, the worst, 
most corrupt and inept anywhere in the world (if they even have a functioning gov-
ernment at all), now loudly...... 
 
....and viciously telling the people of the United States, the greatest and most pow-
erful Nation on earth, how our government is to be run. Why don’t they go back and 
help fix the totally broken and crime infested places from which they came. Then come 
back and show us how.... 
 
 ....it is done. These places need your help badly, you can’t leave fast enough. 
I’m sure that Nancy Pelosi would be very happy to quickly work out free travel ar-
rangements! (14 July 2019) 
 
These tweets are an example of how Donald Trump engages with the public and ex-
presses his political ideas. Because they talk about four non-white American citizens 
and invite them to  “go back” to their country, the tweets can be read with white su-
premacist undertones. Trump’s claims are often also Islamophobic, and it is not surpris-
ing that two of the four congresswomen he attacked self-identify as Muslims.  Islam-
ophobia on Twitter, for Trump, is a strategy to instill nostalgia to validate his political 
sentiments (Ouassini and Amini 2018). 
The example shows how some politicians are currently changing traditional commu-
nication strategies and increasingly rely on social networks. Trump’s tweets also sug-
gest that the content and form of these messages are generally colloquial, but also 
abusive and violent. Scholars have been studying how new forms of communication, 
particularly Twitter, influence contemporary politics and voting behaviors (Ausserhofer 
and Maireder 2013; Bracciale, Martella and Visentin 2018; Conway, Kenski and Wang 
2015; Gruzd and Roy, 2014). The Internet arguably plays a key role in fostering political 
participation because it offers venues for people to follow and message politicians.  
My argument is that a certain type of Internet communication, spread by Trump and 
other far-right politicians globally, is effective because it can involve people emotional-
ly. Emotion and affect are central in the creation of nationalistic discourses, especially 
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when they engage physical or symbolic actions against a certain group (Ahmed 2014). 
People tend to feel attached to an idea when they want to protect something they care 
for deeply, and when they feel angry or scared for a potential threat. It is for this rea-
son that controversial topics (such as anti-migration or anti-Islam discourses) have the 
power to evoke strong emotional reactions. By taking advantage of these emotional 
mechanisms, some politicians establish a communication style that I define “emotional 
antagonism.” Elsewhere, (2017) I analyzed emotional antagonism as a form of commu-
nication that is based on verbal abuses and harassment rather than constructive con-
versations and dialogue. In the next section of this article (section 2), I define emotion-
al antagonism through an analysis of the work of Chantal Mouffe (2005, 2013), and I 
explain how it may be employed as a political stratagem to exploits people’s emotions 
at the expenses of minorities.  
Islamophobia represents an ideal case study of emotional antagonism for two rea-
sons. First, contemporary religion has a public role that urges scholars to explore its po-
litical engagements (Giorgi and Polizzi 2014). Second, religion is intrinsically connected 
with emotions because, despite its publicness, it involves intimate feelings. As a result, 
the expression of religious sentiments may lead to affective conflicts among different 
groups, often entangled with social and cultural issues (Tarantino 2014). In particular, 
Islam in Europe tends to involve anti-migration and racist discourses. Anti-Islam feel-
ings constitute a complex form of emotional antagonism, which individuates Muslims 
as primary antagonists of so-called “western values.” According to Alessandra Vitullo 
(2019), Internet is a venue that promotes all kind of radical opinions, with anti-Islam 
hate speech being particularly prominent in the U.S. and Europe (110).  In a previous 
study, I explored Twitter-based Islamophobia in the aftermath of the British referen-
dum on European Union membership (Brexit), and discovered that Twitter may provide 
a fertile venue for anti-Muslim narratives (Evolvi 2018). Section 3 of this article ex-
plores the notion of Islamophobia and explains how it is entangled with various social 
discourses, such as ethnicity and migration, in instances of emotional antagonism. 
Online Islamophobia is a timely topic for academic inquiries. Amnesty International 
(2019) finds that, prior to the 2019 European elections, Islam was among the groups 
that attracted hate speech the most from Italian politicians. Despite the proliferation of 
political actors who spread anti-Muslim Internet narratives, online Islamophobia re-
mains generally under-researched (Awan 2014). As a result, studies on political partici-
pation and the Internet rarely focus on Islam and migration, and tend not to address 
the topic of emotions and affectivity. To address this gap, this article looks at Islam-
ophobic discourses on Twitter and explores the following questions: How do certain 
online exchanges emotionally frame Muslims as the social “others” in relation to Euro-
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pean culture? Why and how does the Internet facilitate the spread of emotional antag-
onism? What type of political propaganda and participation is connected to affective 
online Islamophobia? To answer these questions, I performed a digital ethnography 
and a qualitative textual analysis of Islamophobic tweets sent by users that participate 
in conversations about politics, as I will describe in section 4 of this article. Section 5 
analyses two case studies: first, the circulation of the Twitter hashtag #Brexit in con-
nection to Islam; second, Islamophobic tweets in response to the anti-migrant hashtag 
#chiudiamoiporti (close the ports) launched in summer 2018 by Italian Vice Prime Min-
ister Matteo Salvini. These two cases do not only address Islam, but they are connected 
to a general fear of migration and social change which leads to instances of racism. In 
the conclusion, I will analyze how certain Twitter narratives frame Islam as “other” to 
European culture, in a way that echoes the problematic construction of Eastern sub-
jects in relation to “the West” analyzed in Edward Said’s work on Orientalism (1979). I 
will also address how Twitter evokes emotional reactions in social media users. This 
creates a model of political participation and communication that is not necessarily lim-
ited to Islamophobia, but may regard various religious-based conflicts and social and 
cultural tensions.  
 
 
2. Media, Affect, and Antagonism 
 
The Internet offers venues for affective interactions and political participation that 
has emotional value. Zizi Papacharissi (2016), for example, finds that Twitter can 
spread emotional narratives through hashtags. By analyzing the resignation of Hosni 
Mubarak in Egypt and the Occupy movement, Papacharissi explains that people em-
ploy hashtags to connect with users who hold similar opinions. In so doing, they consti-
tute “networked publics” that use Twitter to express their feelings about events and 
issues. This results in a “digital affect culture,” which permeates Internet spaces where 
people find themselves reading, writing, and sharing narratives with an emotional con-
tent. (Döveling, Harju, and Sommer 2018).  
The display of emotions, however, does not only involve social justice and mutual 
solidarity. According to Sarah Ahmed (2014), emotions are often determined by power 
relationships and reinforce social and cultural norms. Therefore, they may lead to prac-
tices of “othering,” as happens in the case of fascist political organizations that circu-
late anti-Islam ideas to protect the alleged Christian identity of Europe. Drawing from 
Ahmed, Mona Abdel-Fadil (2019) contextualizes the expression of emotions online as 
fueling identity articulations and being performative. Through the example of a Face-
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book group whose users promote Christianity, Adbel-Fadil explains that Internet-based 
emotions can be channeled towards a specific “object” that evokes feelings. For in-
stance, the Christian cross can become a “sticky” object (to employ Ahmed vocabulary) 
that affectively mobilizes people who want to protect and wear it, and creates emo-
tional conflicts among users belonging to different religious groups.  
There are Internet venues that can exacerbate affective processes of “othering” cer-
tain groups. Social media, in certain circumstances, spread authoritarian ideologies be-
cause of  their ability to impact emotions and circulate misinformation (Deibert 2019). 
Thus, far-right groups may employ Internet communication to spread hate for minori-
ties, including religious minorities (Caiani and Parenti 2009; Dostal 2015). Caterina 
Froio and Bharat Ganesh (2018), explore the Twitter activities of far-right actors and 
find that the Internet can enhance cross-national connections among organizations. 
Twitter provides information streams and emotions to far-right groups, specifically in 
connection to the politicization of Islamophobic feelings. In this context, this article 
employs the term “far-right” politics to indicate what Cas Mudde (2007) defines “ex-
treme right” or “radical right.” Differently from classical right-wing politicians, radical 
right organization share three ideologies of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. 
The proliferation of such groups on social networks may result in the creation of 
hashtags such as the two analyzed in the present article, whose circulation extends be-
yond far-right politicians.   
The potential of the Internet to create affective networks may encounter emotional 
practices that marginalize minorities and negatively conditions exchanges between 
groups. According to Chantal Mouffe (2013), groups can enter in debates characterized 
by agonistic or antagonistic relations. Agonism is the process in which various social 
actors debate and express their ideas. According to Mouffe, agonism has positive out-
comes, because in a democracy it is vital that various groups have the possibility to 
participate in public discussions. Even if they do not agree with each other, social 
groups are involved in agonistic politics when they recognize the legitimacy of their 
opponents. 
While agonism presupposes that every actor engaged in a public debate is granted 
equal participation, antagonism is a type of conflict based on the marginalization of 
one or more groups. In antagonistic exchanges, marginalized groups are often em-
ployed as scapegoats for social problems and they are prevented from taking part in 
public debates. An example of antagonism is found in Margaret Thatcher’s strategy to 
win a part of the working class by turning it against feminists and migrants (Carpentier 
and Cammaerts 2006). Therefore, antagonism is a form of conflict with negative out-
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comes because the power imbalance among actors often prevent the reaching of solu-
tions for social issues.  
As for the work of Ahmed (2014), scapegoating a given social group (for instance, 
Muslims) makes it the object of strong emotions, such as hate and fear.  My argument 
is that the Internet, in some cases, creates antagonistic, rather than agonistic, conflicts 
against certain groups. Furthermore, it enhances the abusive character and the com-
plexity of some narratives by offering a platform for the display of emotions. The no-
tion of political antagonism can thus benefit from a focus on emotions that describes 
certain mechanisms of online communication. It is for this reason that I call “emotional 
antagonism” those Internet-based processes that characterize some narratives against 
minorities, such as Muslims.   
 
 
3. Islamophobia as Emotional Antagonism 
 
Islam is often considered as “other” in relation to a certain idea of white European 
culture. According to Talal Asad (2003), Islamophobia sparkles from the willingness of 
protecting a supposedly Judeo-Christian matrix of European civilization, and the anxie-
ties for those, such as Muslims, that are considered as non-Europeans. It is for this rea-
son that the diffusion of Islamophobia can be considered an example of emotional an-
tagonism that excludes Muslims from social and political debates and makes them an 
object of hate and fear. Islamophobia is defined as “unfounded hostility towards Islam” 
and is based on prejudices and stereotypes (Runnymede Trust 1997, 4). It considers Is-
lam as a monolithic and unchangeable entity that is inferior to “western values” and 
intrinsically violent. While Islamophobia has been exacerbated by recent episodes of 
Islamic terrorism and negative media representations of Islam (Saeed 2007), it can be 
traced back to the 7th century “orientalist” view of the Arab world (Said 1979).  
Far-right groups contribute to spread such Islamophonic ideologies. It is important to 
notice that Islamophobic and xenophobic right-wing narratives are often complexly en-
tangled with core national values and tend to endorse liberal values. Radical right par-
ties in various European countries posit that migrants and Muslims supposedly threat-
en tolerance and liberalism (Halikiopoulou, Mock, and Vasilopoulou 2013). As a result, 
these parties frame nativist discourses as an attempt to “protect” the core values of 
western democracies.  For example, Caterina Froio (2018) analyzes Islamophobic narra-
tives in the French far-right and discovers that they frame Islam as incompatible with 
women’s rights, LGBTQ rights, and animal rights. By promulgating such frames, far-
right parties can also employ liberal values as tools to appeal to the general population. 
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This happens, in particular, when they promote the idea that there is a sharp contrast 
between “the people,” allegedly defended by far-right actors, and “the elites,” suppos-
edly characterized by political correctness and indifference for the voters (Brubaker 
2017). 
As a result, Islamophobia often involves racial, cultural and religious aspects. Islam-
ophobic attacks may be provoked by visible religious symbols and include gendered 
aggressions against veiled women (Allen 2015). It can be compared to European anti-
Semitism between the two worlds wars because it is a form of cultural racism triggered 
by religious belonging (Meer and Noorani 2008). Islamophobia is also connected with 
race and ethnicity because attacks often target non-white people. For instance, there 
are cases in which perpetrators harass non-Muslims because they have physical and 
ethnic characteristics that remind of Muslims, such as being of south-Asian descent 
(Awan and Zempi, 2018). It is for this reason that the Runnymede Trust, in its 20th-
anniversary report (Elahi and Khan 2017), updated the notion of Islamophobia based 
on the United Nation definition of racism. Considering Islamophobia as a form of rac-
ism urges a focus on its broad social and political implications, which go beyond simple 
religious faith.  
Furthermore, anti-Muslim racism tends to conflate Muslims with migrants, and vice-
versa (Tibi 2010). Migration towards the European Union from non-member countries, 
estimated to count 2,4 million people in 2017 (Eurobarometer 2018), is one of the rea-
sons Islam is growing in Europe. Muslims in Europe, indeed, accounted for 4% of the 
population in 1990, reached 6% in 2010 and are projected to be 8% in 2030 (Hackett 
2016). Therefore, the media coverage of migrants and asylum seekers arriving in Eu-
rope often focuses on representations of the Muslim population (Smets and Bozdağ 
2018). However, this may result in a simplistic assumption that all migrants and asylum 
seekers are Muslims, ignoring those who come from other religious backgrounds and 
reducing them only to their faith. It can also exacerbate the Islamophobic character of 
some parties that implement anti-migration politics, such as the French Front National 
(Davies 2010) and the British Britain First (Allen 2014).  
Therefore, emotional antagonism connected with Islamophobia is multi-faced be-
cause it targets people simultaneously for their religious belonging, their ethnic and ra-
cial background, and their migrant status (real or perceived). In particular, anti-Muslim 
feelings may assume an intense emotional dimension in online platforms. According to 
the British Association Tell Mama (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks), online Islamopho-
bia is as concerning as offline harassment, with 402 reports of online attacks occurred 
in the UK in 2015 (Littler and Feldman 2015). Similarly, the European Islamophobia Re-
port (Bayrakli and Hafez 2019) finds an increase in online Islamophobia, and explains 
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that the anonymity of Internet platforms permits Islamophobic people to attack Mus-
lims and to organize street-level Islamophobic protests. Online attacks include the cir-
culation of specific and violent anti-Muslim hashtags, such as #KillAllMuslims (Awan 
and Zempi 2015). I would argue that this is a form of emotional antagonism that ex-
cludes Muslims from Internet debates and emotionally describes them as supposedly 
incompatible with secular democracies. In this article, I will explore the multifaced na-
ture of Islamophobic emotional antagonism through an analysis of anti-Muslim tweets. 
 
 
4. Exploring Twitter-based Islamophobia: Methods 
 
There are social and political circumstances that may exacerbate emotional antago-
nism against Muslims. In this paper, I analyze two specific cases. The first case explores 
tweets containing #Brexit, the most-frequently-used hashtag during the British Refer-
endum campaign (Howard and Kollanyi 2016). The second case regards tweets embed-
ding the hashtag #chiudiamoiporti (close the ports), launched in 2018 by Italian politi-
cian Matteo Salvini when he did not let a ship dock at Italian ports because it was 
transporting rescued migrants. These two cases are not directly connected with Islam 
but regard the decision to secure national borders, by leaving the European Union or 
physically closing ports to migrants.  
Exploring hashtags (Twitter keywords marked with the symbol “#”) is a useful re-
search practice to follow thematic narratives because they connect tweets that discuss 
the same topic (Naaman, Becker, and Gravano 2011). The two hashtags #Brexit and 
#chiudiamoiporti are interesting cases as they generated a high number of comments 
from a variety of actors who often discuss also multiculturalism and religious pluralism. 
They also give insights on how far-right politicians engage audiences on Twitter. While 
accounts who circulate these hashtags do not necessarily belong to far-right groups, 
the analysis shows how these ideologies are spread across digital platforms and reach a 
variety of users.  
Both events provoked Twitter reactions immediately after the date they happened, 
which is the 23rd of June 2016 for Brexit and the 10th of June 2018 for Salvini’s decision 
to close the ports. In the first phase of my research, I performed an online observation 
of the two events closely following the hashtags during these two dates and in the 
three days immediately after each of them. While I did not actively participate in dis-
cussions, this observation allowed me closely exploring how certain discourses devel-
oped during the time the hashtags were trending on Twitter. I performed an explorato-
ry social media ethnography, a term borrowed from John Postill and Sarah Pink’s 
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(2012) work on activism and social media. This allowed familiarizing with the predomi-
nant narrative patterns that followed these two events and individuate tweets that 
mentioned Islam. While my research focuses on Twitter, in this phase I also paid close 
attention to other media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and online newspaper 
articles on the topic.  
The second phase of my research includes the selection of relevant tweets that men-
tioned the two hashtags #Brexit and #chiudiamoiporti together with the words “Islam” 
and/or “Muslim.” I selected the tweets among those which the Twitter Standard 
Search API (application programming interfaces) considered as most popular in the 
days immediately after the events. While Twitter API follows algorithm logics that are 
not necessarily representative of all the conversations happening on the platform 
(Sharma 2013), it does provide an overview of some dominant narratives in a given 
context. Combined with the social media ethnography, this allowed for the selection of 
tweets that are relevant to understand certain facets of Islamophobia. Therefore, this 
study does not aim at being representative of all actors’ opinions about the two events, 
but qualitatively analyses some examples of Twitter-based Islamophobia in the context 
of contemporary political debates.  
I selected tweets connected with issues of migration and multiculturalism and hold-
ing an Islamophobic character. There are various resources which help classifying nar-
ratives as Islamophobic. For instance, the Counter-Islamophobia Toolkit (Law, Easat-
Daas, and Sayyid 2018) considers that Islamophobic discourses frame Islam as being a 
threat to security, unassimilable, a demographic threat, a theocracy, a threat to identi-
ty, against gender inequality, ontologically different, intrinsically violent, unable to at-
tain European citizenship, and homophobic (9-10). To determine which tweets had an 
Islamophobic character I employed eight criteria developed by the Runnymede Trust 
(1997, 4). Therefore, I classified as “Islamophobic” the tweets that had at least one of 
these characteristics: 1) depict Islam as monolithic; 2) negatively see Islam as “other” 
to “Western” culture; 3) frame Islam as “inferior” to “Western” culture; 4) describe Is-
lam as aggressive and violent; 5) consider Muslims as manipulative; 6) reject Muslim 
criticism of “the West”; 7) defend discriminatory behaviors against Muslims and 8) 
characterize anti-Muslim discourses as acceptable. I thus selected a sample of 308 
tweets containing the hashtag #Brexit and 179 tweets connected to the hashtag 
#chiudiamoiporti, sent either by Salvini or other users, for a total of 487 tweets. These 
tweets are those that were deemed as “popular” by the Twitter API. The difference in 
volume between the two hashtags is likely due to the greater international attention to 
Brexit and the fact that English is spoken by a higher number of people. I did not place 
any geographical or linguistic preference in my search, but the majority of tweets con-
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taining #Brexit were in English and those with #chiudiamoiporti in Italian, which I trans-
lated in English for this article. In the analysis, I took into account the specific charac-
teristics of the two countries. However, because Twitter facilitates global connections, 
the hashtags kindled narratives that go beyond national borders.  
After selecting a sample, the third phase of the research involved a textual analysis 
of the tweets inspired by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Paying attention to social 
inequalities and power relationships, CDA is a method that helps to understand narra-
tives produced by or about social minorities, such as Muslims in Europe (Wodak and 
Bush 2004). In my analysis, I took into account both the text of the tweets (which in-
cluded 140 characters in 2016, and 280 in 2018) and the pictures that are sometimes 
posted. The qualitative manual coding allowed also exploring whether tweets con-
tained other hashtags, links to news outlets, or if they were referencing another tweet. 
I only considered original tweets, but I noted the number of retweets as part of my 
analysis to identify those posts that gained the most attention.  
In analyzing the tweets, I focused on how emotions are expressed. Following the 
work of Abdel-Fadil (2019), I considered that there is often a lack of distinction be-
tween different emotions. Abdel-Fadil focuses on the “making of emotion” and “what 
emotions do” (13) in relation to online conflicts. I adopted Abdel-Fadil’s approach by 
considering tweets’ terminology that indicates anger and hate, but also disgust, sar-
casm, pride. For example, disturbing terms such as “global cancer” in reference to Is-
lam (as analyzed in section 5) suggest that the user who wrote the tweet feels hate; at 
the same time, the term likely tries to provoke an emotional reaction in people reading 
the tweets, either of anger and support, or indignation and disgust. By so doing, I cod-
ed tweets and expressions not in specific emotional categories, but in relation to the 
narrative patterns and the type of affective conversations they were likely to provoke.  
In this way, it was possible to understand the predominant discursive patterns and 
the ideological connections among tweets, and to analyze some characteristics of emo-
tional antagonism and online Islamophobia. The two hashtags were created in the 
framework of specific campaigns, but the dataset showed that some users embedded 
them in narratives unrelated to these cases. This suggests that the analysis of #Brexit 
and #chiudiamoiporti can show patterns applicable to Islamophobia in more general 
terms.  
 
 
5. Islamophobic Twitter Narratives: Two Case-Studies 
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The analysis of Islamophobic tweets shows that there are some predominant narra-
tive patterns, which often mention politicians and political parties, as well as gender, 
ethnicity, and migration. Here below, I will present the data collected about the two 
case studies of #Brexit and #chiudiamoiporti, with a focus on the narratives that show 
how Twitter users participate in and comment on political decisions. I will then discuss 
the two cases by explaining why I consider them examples of emotional antagonism.  
 
#Brexit  
On the 23rd of June 2016, the UK held a referendum on the UK withdrawal from Eu-
ropean Union (EU) membership, commonly known as “Brexit.” The referendum result-
ed in almost 52% of the voters supporting the Leave position. Migration was an im-
portant issue during the referendum campaign, because one of the consequences of 
leaving the EU is the prevention of free circulation of goods and citizens across UK bor-
ders. While not all supporters of the Leave position were motivated by concerns with 
migration, the campaign often assumed racist and xenophobic tones. Nigel Farage, one 
of the most vocal advocates for the Leave position, unveiled a poster which shows a 
long line of migrants, mostly young men who appear to have a Middle Eastern or North 
African background. The poster says “Breaking Point: the EU has failed us all” and “We 
must break free of the EU and take back control” (van Houtum and Lacy 2017). This ep-
isode shows that Brexit was connected with a specific idea of British identity that large-
ly marginalizes migrants for being non-white and (supposedly) belonging to Islam. In-
deed, the aftermath of the referendum was characterized by a surge in racist attacks 
(Cuerden and Rogers 2017). In this timeframe, the aforementioned British association 
Tell Mama denounced a spike in Islamophobic crimes (2016), many of which occurred 
on social networks. The Center for the Analysis of Social Media at Demos found that, 
between the 27th of May and the 2nd of June, 28% of pro-Brexit tweets related to the 
EU campaign contained references to immigration; discussions about immigration and 
tweets with explicit anti-Islamic wording peaked over the day of the Brexit announce-
ment (Miller, Arcostanzo, Smith, Krasodomski-Jones, Wiedlitzka, Jamali, and Dale 
2016). 
The hashtag #Brexit was used both by supporters of the Leave and the Remain posi-
tion. During my social media ethnography, I observed that, when used to discuss Islam, 
the hashtag tends to contain racist and Islamophobic undertones.  This suggests that 
the connection between Islam and Brexit was stronger among those groups holding an-
ti-Islam feelings. At the same time, Islamophobic tweets are almost always in support 
of Brexit; this does not mean that all Leave supporters are Islamophobic, but suggests 
that people who are against Islam probably also tended to see the EU negatively. In-
Partecipazione e conflitto, 12(3) 2019: 871-897, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v12i3p871 
  
882 
 
deed, Islamophobic tweets sent immediately after the referendum praise it as a solu-
tion that would allegedly protect the UK against Muslims by preventing migration, even 
if leaving the European Union would limit the circulation of people and goods among 
states that are predominantly Christian. Tweets that assume this viewpoint describe 
Islam as a threat that arrives from abroad, rather than a religion that exists and has a 
place in the UK.  
Tweets that discuss Brexit and Islam in terms of migration often have a strong emo-
tional character, sometimes further enhanced by violent expressions and pictures. For 
instance, a tweet, sent on the 24 June 2016, embeds an Islamophobic cartoon. The car-
toon is divided in two parts: on the left, there is a picture of the queen of England with 
a guard, wearing the typical tall fur cap, and the date “2015.” On the right, the queen is 
portrayed as wearing an Islamic burqa that covers her entirely, and instead of the 
guard there is an Arab-looking man with a menacing attitude and holding a weapon; 
here, the date is “2050.” The picture is commented upon as follows: 
 
 God saved the Queen & Britain from Islam tonight! #Brexit (24 June 2016) 
 
The tweet hints at the emotional attachment of British people for the monarchy and 
suggests that Brexit would protect the British nation from Islam. Tweets that similarly 
mention national values and symbols as being threatened by Islam often contain 
hashtags and keywords such as “islamization,” “terrorism,” “jihad,” #Islamexit. This is 
consistent with the findings of the Italian Observatory Vox (2019), which individuates 
among the most-frequently used Islamophobic terms in online venues “terrorist” and 
“jihadist.” 
Islamophobia is expressed in these tweets through narratives that frame Muslims as 
intrinsically violent and misogynistic, or as manipulative and insincere. These are com-
mon tropes of Islamophobic discourses, as explained in the Runnymede Trust report 
(1997. These two narratives coexist in many of the tweets in the dataset, and I will fur-
ther illustrate them with some examples.  
The first type of narratives, which sees Islam as misogynistic, opposes Muslim migra-
tion because Muslim men are allegedly unable to control their sexuality and sexually 
attack women and children. In this context, Islamophobic narratives tend to offer the 
portray of the “dangerous Muslim” as male. These narratives almost exclusively con-
cern white British women and girls, framed as powerless victims of predatory Muslim 
men. These exchanges rarely talk about Muslim women, and when they are men-
tioned, they are frequently described as problematic because they have numerous 
children to supposedly spread Islam in the UK. These discourses unveil a specific un-
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derstanding of gender norms, sharply divided in racial and religious categories: white 
British women and girls need to be “protected” by white British men against Muslim 
men. The emotional character of such narratives is exacerbated by direct references to 
rape and sexual abuse: 
 
It’s not xenophobia when Muslim migrants are gang raping kids. #Brexit (27 June 
2016) 
 
This Islamophobic tweet suggests that all Muslims sexually assault children. It is part 
of a narrative trend that depicts an image of migrants as mostly male and young, likely 
echoing the poster unveiled by Nigel Farage mentioned earlier in this article. In this 
way, migrants and Muslims are conflated in the character of the dangerous man who, 
because of his religion, is unable to respect British white women and children and 
would become a violent threat if let in the country.  
The second type of narratives, which frames Muslims as manipulative and insincere, 
includes descriptions of a supposed “Muslim agenda” to conquer Europe. These narra-
tives are based on the idea that Muslims try to spread their religion (and, consequent-
ly, their violent and misogynistic attitude) in Europe through migration. The European 
Union, indeed, is often framed as supporting a so-called “Muslim invasion” through 
pro-migration policies. These narratives frequently mention transnational politics. For 
instance, many tweets denigrate German chancellor Angela Merkel, accused of facili-
tating irregular immigration and secretly trying to spread Islam in Europe. Similarly, 
Barak Obama is criticized for being a “friend” of Islam, sometimes also with references 
to the conspiracy theory that wants him to secretly be Muslim. In addition, many 
tweets refer to Donald Trump, at the time campaigning for U.S. presidency, and embed 
hashtags such as #MAGA (Make American Great Again, Trump’s slogan). These tweets 
praise Trump as a strong political leader able to stop Muslim immigration, something 
that Brexit would also allegedly do. For example, a tweet sent of the 24th of June 2016 
says:  
 
Kudos to Great Britain and their #Brexit. We’ll do our part electing Donald Trump, 
ridding the global cancer known as Islam (24 June 2016) 
 
This tweet shows that Brexit was largely understood as a global phenomenon con-
nected with the rise of far-right ideologies. Islamophobia becomes a way to endorse 
certain political leaders and reject others based on their alleged religious belonging and 
allegiances. Such tweets may also be the product of political propaganda that instills 
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fear for certain social groups (such as Muslims) to claim protection for a given set of 
values and lifestyles.  
These two narratives are often entangled in Islamophobic tweets that frame Mus-
lims as violent and manipulative, supposedly engaged to destroy British and European 
values. Islamophobia, in this case, is powerful in denying Islam the status of religion, 
rather describing it as an ideology that is antagonistic. This narrative is strongly emo-
tional because, on the one hand, it frames the EU as a dangerous place that tries to 
undermine British values by favoring immigration, hence the need to “take back con-
trol.” On the other hand, Islam is described as incompatible with British and, paradoxi-
cally, European values. Both nuances largely ignore non-Muslim migrants and refugee 
seekers, as well as British-born Muslims. Tweets that support such viewpoints diffuse 
extremely simplistic narratives, which construct Britishness based on being ethnically 
white and religiously Christian (or belonging to a Christian background). It is a narrative 
that affectively engages users by creating a sharp division between what needs to be 
protected (a certain understanding of Britishness) and what can pose a threat (Islam 
and migration). The circulation of such narratives reinforces the antagonistic character 
of Twitter Islamophobia as it does not invite conversation with Muslims as possible in-
terlocutors, but rather considers them as unable to enter public debates because of 
their alleged violent character.  
 
#Chiudiamoiporti 
 
The hashtag #chiudiamoiporti (close the ports) was launched by Italian Vice Prime 
Minister and Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini. He took the leadership of the far-right 
party Lega Nord (Northern League) in 2013, radically changing the party’s focus: while, 
at the beginning, it supported regionalism and independentism for the northern Italian 
regions, Lega Nord came to mainly promote nationalistic politics and anti-immigration 
measures (Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone 2018). Salvini also extensively employs 
social networks, counting 1,04 million followers on Twitter and 3.5 million likes on Fa-
cebook (as per May 3, 2019). According to a report published by Amnesty International 
(2019), Salvini is the Italian politician who had the most social media interactions be-
fore the 2019 European Elections, diffusing also offensive and discriminatory posts. 
Froio and Ganesh (2018) choose Salvini’s Twitter account as a prominent example of 
transnational far-right online exchanges.  
When the NGO Sos Mediterranee boat Aquarius rescued 629 migrants (including 123 
children and seven pregnant women) after a shipwreck, in June 2018, Salvini refused to 
let it dock in Italian ports. Italy, a natural bridge between Europe and Africa, has re-
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cently seen an increase of migrants arriving in dinghy boats from Africa and the Middle 
East to seek asylum. According to the Dublin III Regulation (EU Regulation 604/2013) , 
migrants must generally seek asylum in the first European country they reach. This 
makes Italy a nodal point for the management of migration, but also fosters the for-
mation of anti-migrant groups, often fomented by Salvini’s political ideologies. Salvini 
communicated his decision to close the ports to ship Aquarius by launching the hashtag 
#chiudiamoiporti on the 10th of June 2018. The hashtag was first circulated on Twitter 
together with a picture of Salvini with crossed arms, looking at the camera with a pro-
vocative demeanor. This Twitter post provoked 2984 comments, 2635 retweets and 
10548 likes, and attracted 182k reactions, 18k comments and 40k shares on Facebook 
(as of 12 June 2019). The project Hatemeter (2018) individuates, among keywords used 
to spread Islamophobia online in Italy, also the hashtag #chiudiamoiporti (19-20). This 
hashtag is only one example of how Salvini and the Italian government promote anti-
migration measures. In summer 2019, for instance, ship Capitan Carola Rackete decid-
ed to dock on Italian shores to rescue migrants despite not having obtained the author-
ization to do so. The event sparked new conversations about the need of closing (or 
opening) ports to migrants and refugee seekers, with people continuing to employ 
#chiudiamoiporti to discuss it. 
The exploration of narratives around the hashtag, which includes a live observation 
of responses and retweets of the original #chiudiamoiporti tweet, shows that Islam is 
predominantly framed as entangled with migration. This reflects a discursive strategy 
of Salvini, who tends to mention Islam and migration indistinctively in many of his 
tweets. This attitude is exemplified in a tweet he sent on the 28 January 2018, almost 
six months before launching #chiudiamoiporti, where he wrote: 
 
Islam in Italy? Either it becomes more open, or otherwise it’s a danger. With Salvini 
in power STOP to any irregular or illegal Islamic presence in Italy. Do you agree? CIRCU-
LATE THIS! (28 January 2018, emphasis in original, translated by the author) 
 
The tweet contains a link to an article from the right-wing Italian newspaper Il Gior-
nale, which talks about Salvini’s decision to close Italian borders to migrants and asy-
lum seekers. The tweet is Islamophobic in implying that Islam is intrinsically “irregular” 
and that migration primarily involves a “dangerous” Islam. The analysis of tweets that 
mention the hashtag #chiudiamoiporti and the word “Islam” shows similar narrative 
patterns as this tweet. They usually do not explicitly talk about Muslims, but mention 
Islam mirroring Salvini’s claim that migrants and Islam are intrinsically connected.  
Tweets that embed the hashtag #chiudiamoiporti may either strongly support Sal-
vini’s decision or criticize it, in both cases often employing emotional and abusive lan-
Partecipazione e conflitto, 12(3) 2019: 871-897, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v12i3p871 
  
886 
 
guage. The analysis shows that Islamophobic tweets embedding #chiudiamoiporti also 
support and praise Salvini.  Among them, it is possible to find various narrative pat-
terns. For instance, many tweets talk about violence in relation to Islam, employing 
terms such as “afroislamic” to belittle migrants. Predominant hashtags that express 
these narratives are #StopIslam, #NoIslam, #StopInvasione (stop invasion). Various 
tweets, indeed, describe Islam as planning an “invasion” against Italy and Europe. For 
example:  
 
#Marocco #Tunisia #Libia #Egitto #Iraq #Siria #Libano #Armenia #Kurdistan #Azer-
baijan before 700 [there was] #Christianity, then #Islam with Holy #war. #NoIslam 
#StopIslam #chiudiamoiporti #ngo #immigration #EU #Italia #Europa #Asia #Africa 
#Salvini (13 June 2018, translated by the author)  
 
Through the repetition of multiple hashtags, including “Holy #war” (“#Guerra santa” 
in original), the tweet powerfully evokes the crusades to imply that Islam is intrinsically 
dangerous for Christianity. This narrative does not elaborate on why Islam is supposed-
ly problematic, but assumes that Muslims have been antagonistic “others” in relation 
to Christian civilization from the time of the crusades. 
Another dominant pattern in these Islamophobic tweets is nationalism. Several 
emotional and nationalistic tweets describe Italians as hard-working and good-natured 
people, as opposed to migrants who allegedly leave their countries in hope to live out 
of humanitarian help. These narratives are Islamophobic because they conflate Mus-
lims with migrants and describe all Muslims as manipulative and cunning individuals. In 
these tweets, it is possible to find various other hashtags, such as #Italexit and #fuori-
daquestaeuropa (out from Europe), or #primagliitaliani (Italians first), a reference to 
international far-right politics that recalls, for instance, the xenophobic British organi-
zation “Britain First.” For example: 
 
#Macron can think about the problems that happen in his place, he has plenty: in 
Paris it feels like Nigeria and Islamist attacks in France are countless. These are the re-
sults of the savage immigration they would like to impose on us! #Aquarius #primag-
liitaliani #chiudiamoiporti (10 June 2018, translated by the author) 
 
This tweet comments on French President Emmanuel’s Macron criticism of Salvini’s 
politics. The tweet hints at anti-elitist discourses that criticize politicians for allegedly 
not having the best interest of citizens in mind. It is likely connected to the transna-
tional far-right idea of regaining national sovereignty through anti-migration politics. It 
invites political participation that considers the needs of Italians as mutually exclusive 
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with those of migrants. In this way, two essentialized categories emerge: on the one 
hand, the “Italians” who have rights to economic resources and safety because of their 
citizenship and their alleged superiority; and the “Muslim migrants,” who try to steal 
such resources and propagate violence by entering Italian ports.  
Islamophobic tweets show support to Salvini with hashtags such as #SalviniNonMol-
lare (Salvini do not give up). Many Twitter users display an affective attachment by call-
ing him by his first name “Matteo” or referring to him as “Capitano” (captain). These 
narratives are contrasted by tweets that criticize them. For instance, Italian journalist 
Arianna Ciccone counteracted #chiudiamoiporti by creating the hashtag #umanitàaper-
ta (open humanity), which also became trending on Twitter in support of migrants and 
refugees. Together with tweets that praise multiculturalism and solidarity, some re-
sponses to Salvini are violent and emotional. For instance, some users define him as a 
fascist and compare him to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, sometimes sharing pic-
tures of Mussolini’s dead body taken in 1945. While people express antithetical opin-
ions about the decision of closing ports, they rarely engage in constructive debates. 
When users respond to each other, they usually belittle the opposite positions through 
insults and abusive language, often without being pertinent with the argument of their 
opponents.  
The analysis of tweets containing #chiudiamoiporti shows communicative patterns 
largely inspired by narratives circulated by Salvini himself. Arguably, the politician cre-
ates political messages that legitimate generalizations about Muslims and migrants, 
and employs a colloquial and abusive language. He also frames and diffuses the idea 
that the terms “migrants” and “Muslims” both indicate generic “dangerous others” he 
seeks to prevent from entering Italian borders. The hashtag #chiudiamoiporti generat-
ed tweets that, similarly to those mentioning #Brexit, are emotional in considering Is-
lam as violent, dangerous and opposed to Italian values. Also, the antagonistic charac-
ter of these discourses is exacerbated by a nationalistic attitude that considers Italians 
in competition for resources with migrants and threatened by the presence of asylum 
seekers. It invites political participation following affective interactions provoked 
through straightforward and colloquial Twitter messages, as happened when Salvini 
launched the #chiudiamoiporti campaign through a tweet and a picture. Therefore, Is-
lamophobic tweets containing #chiudiamoiporti are examples of emotional antagonism 
because they rarely seek dialogue with other Twitter users and arguably sparkle from 
fear and hate of Muslims and migrants.   
 
#Brexit and #chiudiamoiporti as Emotional Antagonism  
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The two hashtags #Brexit and #chiudiamoiporti helped to spread Islamophobic nar-
ratives. Both are connected to specific events, the referendum on EU membership in 
the UK and Salvini’s decision to close ports to a ship rescuing migrants in Italy. They 
hold differences, especially because they are created in two social and national con-
texts that have specific characteristics. At the same time, both hashtags are responses 
to a general fear of migration and discuss the idea of closing borders. They also include 
transnational connections through references to far-right groups in other countries. 
#Brexit and #chiudiamoiporti point to an understanding of “western” identities that 
excludes certain subjects and privileges a notion of national belonging based on white-
ness and Christian values. These two hashtags are examples of emotional antagonism 
because they elicited affective conversations on Twitter by abusing Muslims instead of 
including them in critical debates.  
The emotional character of tweets containing #Brexit and #chiudiamoiporti is ex-
pressed through words and sentences that contain a high degree of symbolic violence. 
In both case studies, the analysis reveals that Twitter users expressed anti-Muslim feel-
ings in tweets involving anger, fear, hate, pride, sarcasm. They often embed words 
such as “invasion,” “Islamization,” “dangerous,” “cancer,” “savage,” and hashtags such 
as #StopIslam or #Islamexit. References to sexual aggressions and wars exacerbate the 
disturbing character of some of the tweets. At the same time, some tweets pair Islam-
ophobic words with expressions of love and support, especially directed towards politi-
cal actors. This results more prominently from the analysis of #chiudiamoiporti, be-
cause Salvini’s supporters tend to address their comments and thoughts to him directly 
and praise him with affective words. In the case of #Brexit, it is also possible to find ex-
amples of strong support for some political characters, such as Nigel Farage or Donald 
Trump, which are symbolically described as able to protect a certain idea of “western” 
culture.  
This display of emotions can be explained through the work of Sara Ahmed (2014). 
According to Ahmed, emotions are social and cultural practices that involve individual 
and collective bodies. Certain bodies are identified as not being part of the dominant 
understanding of national belonging. In the tweets analyzed in this article, Muslim bod-
ies attract hate by becoming the scapegoat for all that is undesirable in society. In this 
way, Islamophobic narratives describe Muslims as responsible for the loss of economic 
resources, rise in crime and violence, social and cultural changes that allegedly threat 
dominant values. This form of hate, Ahmed writes, is connected with love. Islamopho-
bic groups frame the hate for the “other” as a form of nationalistic love. In the ana-
lyzed tweets, the UK and Italy as nations are described as “objects of love” that need to 
be protected. Besides the two cases, it is possible to find these narratives in various 
Giulia Evolvi, Emotional politics, islamophobic tweets 
 
889 
 
other contexts: Trump’s abusive suggestions that the four congresswomen “go back” 
to their countries is also paired with a description of America as the “greatest and most 
powerful Nation on earth.” From this perspective, emotional interactions merge hate 
and love in narratives that see Muslims as visibly different bodies posing a dangerous 
threat to a beloved set of nationalistic values.  
The emotional description of Muslims as “others” results in antagonistic exchanges. 
Islamophobic narratives essentialize Muslims as a homogeneous and monolithic group 
that holds solely negative characteristics. Tweets containing #Brexit and #chiudi-
amoiporti often suggest the existence of two mutually exclusive categories: “us” (Brit-
ish, Italians, Europeans, westerners) and “them” (Muslims, migrants, non-white and 
non-Christian people). The category of “them” is also associated with “foreign” people, 
and thus implies that Islam forcefully enters national borders through migration.  This 
dichotomy dehumanizes Muslims and deprives Islam of the status of religion, framing it 
as a dangerous ideology instead. As a result, Muslims are attacked and verbally abused, 
but rarely directly involved in conversations. The majority of the analyzed tweets do 
not mention specific examples of the supposed dangerous character of Islam, but belit-
tle all Muslims as a generic category only because of their religious belonging.  
These wide generalizations provoke interactions that are antagonistic. As for the 
work of Chantal Mouffe (2013), conflicts can be agonistic or antagonistic. Agonistic pol-
itics create conflictual debates where all parts have the same possibility of participation 
and can express their viewpoints. This is something that rarely happens in the dataset 
of tweets taken into account. Instead, Islam is talked about almost exclusively by non-
Muslims. While there are situations where Muslims employ social networks to fight Is-
lamophobia (Vis, van Zoonen, and Mihelj, 2011; Zoonen, Vis, and Mihelj, 2011), this 
does not appear to be the case of the two analyzed case studies. Rather, users who 
self-identify as Muslims tend not to respond to Islamophobic claims connected to 
#Brexit and #chiudiamoiporti. These hashtags seem to predominantly generate antag-
onistic debates where people holding different viewpoints belittle each other rather 
than creating constructive conversations. Therefore, the majority of tweets follow 
Mouffe’s model of antagonistic politics because they depict Muslims as passive sub-
jects who do not have the status or the possibility to intervene in conflictual debates. 
These two examples of emotional antagonism also suggest some conclusions on the 
character of Islamophobia, the role of social networks in spreading hate speech, and 
the transformations of transnational political communication.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
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This article analyzed how Islamophobia exemplify some characteristics of far-right 
political discourses that spread on Twitter. It argues that online Islamophobic narra-
tives may have an emotional character, because they involve a strongly affective lan-
guage that individuates Muslims as objects of negative feelings. Among emotional In-
ternet interactions, Islamophobia is an interesting case study because it regards also 
social and religious change, migration, ethnicity, and race. For instance, the two 
hashtags #Brexit and #chiudiamoiporti have been circulated to comment on migration, 
but they also exemplify how certain events can sparkle Islamophobic narratives. This 
analysis focused on Islamophobic tweets to explored how far-right actors employ Twit-
ter and how users engage with and circulate far-right ideologies. Further studies may 
take into account online social conversations between Muslims and Islamophobic ac-
tors, or quantitatively explore anti-Islam online narratives, adding complexity to the 
current understanding of Internet-based Islamophobia. Also, this study is time-
sensitive because it is connected to two specific events, and different results may be 
found by performing the analysis in different periods. Focusing on specific timeframes, 
the present article highlights some changes in how people use media and engage in po-
litical debates, and suggests three main conclusive reflections.  
First, Islamophobic narratives tend to ignore the complex and multifaceted character 
of contemporary Islam. The two case studies show that Islam is often entangled with 
discourses about migration. However, these narratives present a simplistic understand-
ing of Islam as a monolithic entity sharply opposed to “western” liberal values and de-
mocracies. They also tend to falsely equate all migrants with Muslims, producing two 
interconnected narratives: Muslims do not belong to “western” culture because they 
are only recently immigrating, and migrants are supposedly incompatible with secular 
democracies because they belong to Islam. This arguably results from a lack of 
knowledge about Islam, but it may also be a characteristic of emotional antagonism. 
Excluded from social and political debates, Muslims are essentialized as “others” that 
provoke negative emotions, but whose emotions are never taken into account. There-
fore, their complexity as individuals and communities gets erased to focus solely on re-
ligious belonging.  
Second, the Internet may facilitate the spread of emotional antagonism in the form 
of Islamophobic narratives because of some intrinsic characteristics of online plat-
forms. Social networks such as Twitter allow circulating in a short time a high amount 
of information, providing the possibility for instant reactions. Online anonymity may 
lead users to hateful exchanges characterized by impulsivity (Brown 2018). Also, Twit-
ter users can embed pictures, videos, re-tweets, and links to other media sources. This 
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may narratively and visually legitimize certain Islamophobic claims and facilitate the 
diffusion of the so-called “fake news,” which are news that aims at deliberate disinfor-
mation (Douglas 2018). Elizabeth Davis and Megan Boler (2018) identify this phenome-
non as belonging to the “post-truth era” and characterizing contemporary affective 
politics, which are often based on disinformation crafted to appeal to a given public. 
The analyzed tweets do not necessarily make strong use of fake news, but may employ 
pictures, videos, and links that establish misleading connections. For instance, news 
about Muslims involved in violent episodes are used to prove that all Muslim migrants 
are potentially dangerous, even when the original news does not mention migration. 
Therefore, the possibility of connecting Twitter messages to multiple platforms may 
exacerbate the emotional character of Islamophobic narratives.  
Third, Islamophobic emotional antagonism is connected to a type of political partici-
pation that increasingly depends on colloquial and straightforward conversations, as 
showed by Trump’s tweets quoted at the beginning of the article. The two case studies 
suggest that far-right politicians may gain success through a skillful use of social net-
works and a deep understanding of media logics. Even when they regard complex polit-
ical decisions such as leaving the EU or closing the ports to migrants, messages are ex-
tremely simplified and made to fit short tweets. They tend to overlook social and eco-
nomic issues in favor of Islamophobic narratives that individuate Muslims as scape-
goats for a variety of problems. The present article focused on two hashtags created in 
the British and Italian context, but found patterns that can likely be found in other con-
texts. For example, Salvini provokes emotions by employing a colloquial style and es-
tablishing a sense of affective proximity with the voters. This is a type of political com-
munication that, as the tweets quoted in the introduction of this article suggest, is 
found also among other politicians, such as Trump.  This suggests that emotional an-
tagonism is an increasingly important characteristic of contemporary politics and helps 
the creation of transnational networks among far-right actors. It also arguably enhanc-
es the success of these actors by engaging people in new forms of Internet-based polit-
ical participation. 
Therefore, these three characteristics (anti-Muslim feelings, use of the Internet, a 
new style of political communication) frame emotional antagonism as a process that 
marginalizes minorities by denying their participation as interlocutors in political de-
bates, and abusing them through the spread of online affective narratives. This allows 
understanding some nuances of contemporary political discourses, especially for what 
concerns migration and the growth of Islam. As far-right parties seem to gain increas-
ing attention in Europe and elsewhere, it becomes compelling to explore emotional an-
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tagonism as a model that can explain some of the current political behaviors in terms 
of hate speech, anti-migration, and anti-Muslim feelings.  
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